Her treatment at Christus lasted over thirteen months and resulted in total medical charges of $1,089,959.82.......Texas Treasure Treatment????????

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NUMBER 13-06-471-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG DAY CRUISES MARITIME, L.L.C. AND CORPUS CHRISTI DAY CRUISE, L.L.C., Appellants, v. CHRISTUS SPOHN HEALTH SYSTEM D/B/A CHRISTUS SPOHN HOSPITAL MEMORIAL, Appellee. On appeal from the 117th District Court of Nueces County, Texas. O P I N I O N Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza Opinion by Justice Garza Appellants Day Cruises Maritime, L.L.C. and Corpus Christi Day Cruise, L.L.C. appeal from summary judgments granted in favor of appellee Christus Spohn Health System d/b/a Christus Spohn Hospital Memorial ("Christus"). By three issues, appellants contend that the trial court erred. For purposes of organization, appellants' issues will be reordered and referred to as follows: (1) the trial court erred in granting Christus's motion for summary judgment on Christus's counterclaim; (2) the trial court erred in granting Christus's motion for summary judgment, and denying appellants' motion for summary judgment, on appellant's plea in intervention; and (3) the trial court deprived appellants of due process of law. We affirm the trial court's judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.I. Background Judy Ann Lanado, a citizen of the Phillippines, was employed as a card dealer on the "M/V TEXAS TREASURE," a casino vessel operating out of Port Aransas, Texas. Day Cruises Maritime, L.L.C. was the disponent owner of the vessel. (1) The vessel was jointly managed and operated by Florida Day Cruises, Inc. and Corpus Christi Day Cruise, L.L.C. While working on the vessel in August of 2002, Lanado, who was pregnant at the time, became ill. She was first taken to a hospital in Aransas Pass, Texas, and was then moved to Christus in Corpus Christi on August 21, 2002, and admitted there with a diagnosis of cholelithiasis, or stones in the gall bladder. Upon her admission to Christus, Lanado signed a document entitled "Release of Information and Assignment of Health Insurance Benefits" that provided as follows: 1. I authorize CHRISTUS Spohn to a) submit this claim on my behalf and b) receive payment of any authorized benefits, including benefits payable for any physician(s) services due those physicians under contract to the hospital. 2. I certify that the information I have furnished to the Registration Office is correct. 3. I guarantee payment for all services, including those not covered by insurance, Medicaid or Medicare. 4. I hereby authorize my insurance benefits to be paid directly to the physician rendering care of above named patient, for their professional services, and I am financially responsible for non-covered services. 5. I authorize the physician or supplier of care to release any or all of the patient's medical record required for payment. This includes the ordering and results of HIV testing and/or the diagnosis of AIDS, and psychiatric disorders or treatment. On August 23, 2002, Paula E. Coots, a "human resource assistant" for Texas Treasure, signed a document entitled "Guarantee of Payment (Under Section 253 of the Immigration and Nationality Act)." The form stated as follows: I, Paula E. Coots, as Human Resource Assistant of the vessel or aircraft MV TEXAS TREASURE employing the alien crewman LANADO, JUDY ANN who upon arrival at the port of PT. ARANSAS, TX on 21 AUGUST 02 was found to be afflicted with, or suspected of being afflicted with GALL BLADDER. I hereby guarantee to pay any and all expenses incurred or to be incurred for the hospitalization, care, and treatment, and for burial in the event of death, of the said alien crewman. Following surgery at Christus to treat her gall bladder condition, Lanado developed internal bleeding in her abdomen that led to tachycardia and hypotension. As a result of these complications, the fetus died and Lanado suffered severe brain damage due to lack of oxygen. On or about September 27, 2002, she lapsed into a cerebral coma. Although she recovered from her cholelithiasis condition, the cerebral coma left Lanado in a permanent vegetative state. Lanado remained at Christus until her transfer to Avalon Place, a nursing home, on October 1, 2003. Her treatment at Christus lasted over thirteen months and resulted in total medical charges of $1,089,959.82. On December 31, 2002, Jasper Lanado, Judy's brother and permanent guardian, filed a health care liability claim against Christus alleging that Christus was negligent in its care of Judy. (2) Specifically, the Lanados asserted that, while Judy Ann Lanado was at Christus, she "was ignored by physicians and staff to a degree falling below the standard of care necessary as required by Texas law" and that "[t]hese acts and omissions proximately caused the injury to Plaintiffs." Christus filed its original answer to the Lanados' suit on January 31, 2003, denying all allegations. On November 14, 2003, Day Cruises Maritime, L.L.C., Florida Day Cruises, Inc., and Corpus Christi Day Cruise, L.L.C. (collectively referred to as "Texas Treasure") filed a plea in intervention in the Lanados' lawsuit, stating first that under general maritime law it is potentially responsible as Judy's employer for paying her medical expenses, but that it was entitled to damages from the Lanados on the theory that it was equitably subrogated to the Lanados for those medical expenses. Texas Treasure filed an amended plea in intervention on November 21, 2003, adding a request for declaratory judgment that Texas Treasure was not obligated to pay Christus for Lanado's medical care. On November 25, 2003, Texas Treasure filed a traditional motion for summary judgment based on its plea in intervention. Christus subsequently filed a counterclaim against Texas Treasure, contending that Texas Treasure was solely responsible for paying Lanado's hospital bill. (3) Christus filed a motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim on October 14, 2005. The counterclaim and the motion for summary judgment asserted that Texas Treasure was responsible for the entirety of Lanado's hospital bill as a matter of law, for three reasons: (1) Christus had a valid suit on a sworn account and Texas Treasure had failed to file an effective verified denial, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 165; (2) Texas Treasure had executed a valid guarantee of payment with respect to Lanado's medical expenses; and (3) Texas Treasure had a duty of payment to Lanado as a matter of law, and Lanado had effectively assigned to Christus her rights corresponding to that duty. (4) On or about December 2003, the Lanados settled their claim against Christus. As part of the settlement agreement, Christus agreed to pay a lump sum, and fund an annuity that would provide periodic payments to the Lanados. (5) At a hearing on December 13, 2003, Jasper Lanado and the guardian ad litem for the two minor children testified that the settlement agreement was fair and in the best interests of Lanado and her family. The trial court entered an agreed judgment on April 7, 2004, approving the settlement agreement. Neither the settlement agreement nor the agreed judgment contained an admission of negligence or liability on the part of Christus. In fact, the agreed judgment stated specifically that "[t]he Court is further of the opinion that the liability of the Defendant [Christus] is uncertain, doubtful, indefinite, and disputed." As part of the settlement, the Lanados agreed to assign to Christus their right to seek recovery of Judy's medical expenses from her employer. (6) Meanwhile, the claims between Texas Treasure and Christus remained pending in the trial court. Both Texas Treasure and Christus filed traditional motions for summary judgment with respect to the claims made by Texas Treasure in its plea in intervention. Texas Treasure argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on its plea in intervention because, as a matter of law, it was equitably subrogated to the amounts received by the Lanados under their settlement agreement; Christus argued that Texas law provides no such remedy and so those claims must fail as a matter of law. After a hearing on March 26, 2004, the trial court denied Texas Treasure's motion for summary judgment and granted Christus's motion for summary judgment as to Texas Treasure's claims in their plea in intervention. (7) After a hearing on March 3, 2006, the trial court granted Christus's motion for summary judgment with respect to its counterclaim against Texas Treasure, finding in favor of Christus on all three grounds asserted in its counterclaim. Prior to the March 3, 2006 hearing, however, Christus had filed a Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment which included an attorney's fees affidavit that had not been filed with any previous motion. This Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment was apparently not served upon Texas Treasure's trial counsel. (8) After the March 3, 2006 hearing, having discovered that they were not served with Christus's Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment, Texas Treasure filed a motion for sanctions and a motion for leave to file a response to the supplemental motion. After an additional hearing on May 3, 2006, the trial court denied Texas Treasure's motion for sanctions, but partially granted Texas Treasure's motion for leave to file a response to the Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment, stating that it could file a response with regard to attorney's fees only. (9) The trial court rendered its written final judgment on May 26, 2006, awarding Christus damages and pre-judgment interest in the sum of $1,272,714.68. Texas Treasure was also ordered to pay $49,518.68 to Christus in attorney's fees, along with another $25,000 in attorney's fees upon an unsuccessful appeal by Texas Treasure to this Court and $10,000 in attorney's fees upon an unsuccessful appeal by Texas Treasure to the Texas Supreme Court. (10) The trial court specifically stated in its order that Christus's motion for summary judgment: [I]s meritorious and should be granted on all grounds, specifically, a valid sworn account without effective verified denial; Guarantee of Payment under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 C.F.R. §253.1(a) executed by the M/V Texas Treasure; duty of payment of the medical expenses of Judy Lanado under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 C.F.R. §253.1(e), and the executed Assignment of Benefits. Neither party requested findings of fact or conclusions of law. On May 23, 2006, Florida Day Cruises, Inc., filed a suggestion of bankruptcy with the trial court, stating that the company had filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection in Florida on January 18, 2005. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-784. Following this development, Christus filed an unopposed motion on July 27, 2006 to sever its claim against Florida Day Cruises, Inc. The trial court granted the motion by written order on September 22, 2006. Florida Day Cruises, Inc., is not a party to this appeal. Appellants filed their "Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for New Trial" on June 23, 2006, which was overruled by operation of law on August 9, 2006. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(c). Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on August 24, 2006. This appeal ensued. II. Jurisdiction On appeal, appellants first assert that we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal, contending that the judgment issued on May 26, 2006 was voidable and not final because it was rendered not only against appellants but also against Florida Day Cruises, Inc., which had previously filed for bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a); In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 604 (2000) (stating that "when a defendant files a bankruptcy petition, an automatic stay goes into effect and abates any judicial proceeding against that party."). Although the automatic stay would operate only against the bankruptcy debtor, Florida Day Cruises, and not against appellants, see id., appellants contend that the May 26, 2006 judgment was voidable as to appellants because the court's order of severance as to Florida Day Cruises was not entered until September 14, 2006, which, according to appellees, was after the court's plenary jurisdiction had expired. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 329b(e) (providing that a trial court's plenary power to modify a judgment expires thirty days after any timely-filed motions for new trial are overruled); Hood v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 815 S.W.2d 545, 547 (Tex. 1991) (stating that "[a] summary judgment which does not dispose of all parties and issues in the pending suit is interlocutory and not appealable unless a severance is ordered."). However, as appellants seem to have subsequently recognized, this argument is senseless. The only way the trial court's plenary jurisdiction could have expired prior to the entrance of the severance order is if the May 26, 2006 judgment was in fact final and subject to appeal. If, as appellants argue, the May 26, 2006 judgment was interlocutory and not appealable, then the trial court's plenary jurisdiction did not expire and the order of severance was valid, rendering the May 26, 2006 judgment final with respect to appellants. We conclude that the May 26, 2006 judgment became final upon the trial court's order of severance on September 14, 2006. (11) We therefore have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. III. Standard of Review We review a trial court's grant or denial of a traditional motion for summary judgment under a de novo standard of review. Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 816 n.7 (Tex. 2005) (citing Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 290 n.137 (Tex. 2004)); Alaniz v. Hoyt, 105 S.W.3d 330, 345 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.); see also Md. Cas. Co. v. S. Tex. Med. Clinics, P.A., No. 13-06-089-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 279, at *9-11 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Jan. 10, 2008, pet. filed) (mem. op.). The function of summary judgment is to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims and defenses, not to deprive litigants of the right to a trial by jury. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004); Alaniz, 105 S.W.3d at 345. To obtain relief via a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant must establish that no material fact issue exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002); Mowbray v. Avery, 76 S.W.3d 663, 690 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied). After the movant produces evidence sufficient to show it is entitled to summary judgment, the non-movant must then present evidence raising a fact issue. See Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex. 1996). In deciding whether there is a disputed fact issue that precludes summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true. Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985)). Evidence favorable to the movant, however, will not be considered unless it is uncontroverted. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex. 1965). Moreover, every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549. When both parties move for summary judgment and the trial court grants one motion and denies the other, the appellate court should review both parties' summary judgment evidence and determine all questions presented. See FM Props. Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872 (Tex. 2000); Warrantech Corp. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 210 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2006, no pet.). The reviewing court should render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered. See FM Props., 22 S.W.3d at 872; Warrantech, 210 S.W.3d at 765. In reviewing a summary judgment, we consider all grounds presented to the trial court and preserved on appeal in the interest of judicial economy. Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003) and Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. 1996)). IV. Christus's Counterclaim By their first issue, appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting Christus's motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim against Texas Treasure. We agree. As noted above, the trial court granted Christus's summary judgment on its counterclaim, finding that Texas Treasure was liable for Lanado's entire hospital bill based on three distinct grounds: (1) a valid sworn account without an effective verified denial; (2) Texas Treasure's guarantee of payment under the Immigration and Nationality Act; and (3) Texas Treasure's duty of paying benefits under the doctrine of maintenance and cure in conjunction with Lanado's alleged assignment of benefits to Christus. (12) A. Christus's Suit on a Sworn Account The essential elements to prove a sworn account are: (1) that there was a sale and delivery of merchandise or performance of services; (2) that the amount of the account is just, that is, that the prices were charged in accordance with an agreement or were customary and reasonable prices; and (3) that the amount is unpaid. Adams v. H & H Meat Prods., Inc., 41 S.W.3d 762, 773 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); Worley v. Butler, 809 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). When a plaintiff presents prima facie evidence of an account through sworn testimony, the defendant must file a proper verified denial if it wishes to challenge the validity or amount of the account. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 185; see also Tex. R. Civ. P. 93 ("A pleading setting up any of the following matters, unless the truth of such matters appear of record, shall be verified by affidavit. . . . (10) A denial of an account which is the foundation of the plaintiff's action, and supported by affidavit."). Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting Christus's summary judgment on sworn account grounds for three reasons: (1) Christus's suit on a sworn account was not maintainable as a matter of law; (2) if the suit was properly maintainable as a suit on a sworn account, appellants contend that their verified denial was effective; and (3) if appellants' verified denial was ineffective, appellants contend that they were improperly denied the opportunity to amend their answer to provide an effective verified denial. 1. Validity of Christus's Suit on a Sworn Account as a Matter of Law Christus produced summary judgment evidence showing that it provided medical services to Judy Ann Lanado, that the amounts charged were reasonable, and that the amount is unpaid, thereby presenting prima facie evidence sufficient to sustain a suit on a sworn account. Nevertheless, appellants claim that Christus's suit was not maintainable as a matter of law, for two reasons. First, appellants claim that there must be a sale and purchase of personal property to sustain a suit on a sworn account, and that there was no such exchange here. We disagree. Debts incurred as a result of the provision of medical services may be enforced by a suit on a sworn account. See, e.g., Andrews v. E. Tex. Med. Ctr., 885 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1994, no writ); Bryant v. Mission Mun. Hosp., 575 S.W.2d 136, 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ); Leyendecker v. Santa Rosa Med. Ctr., 533 S.W.2d 868, 868-70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ). Second, appellants claim that they are "strangers to the account" because there was no creditor-debtor relationship between appellants and Christus. However, appellants do not cite any authority indicating that such a relationship is necessary to the maintenance of a suit on a sworn account. As such, that argument was inadequately briefed and therefore waived. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). 2. Efficacy of Texas Treasure's Sworn Denial Appellants next contend that, even if Christus's suit on a sworn account was maintainable as a matter of law, summary judgment on that ground was improper because appellants filed an effective sworn denial. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 185. Texas Treasure's third amended original answer to Christus's counterclaim, which was the live pleading at the time the trial court considered Christus's motion for summary judgment, contained an affidavit executed by Texas Treasure's trial counsel which read in relevant part the following: On this day personally appeared before me, the undersigned notary public, JAMES F. BUCHANAN, who stated he is the attorney for Intervenors [Texas Treasure], and that he has read Paragraph I.A. Verified Denial of Intervenors['] Third Amended Answer in the above styled and numbered cause; and that every statement therein is true and correct within his personal knowledge or upon information and belief. (Emphasis added.) The trial court, in awarding summary judgment on sworn account grounds to Christus, found this sworn denial to be ineffective. We agree that Texas Treasure's live sworn denial was ineffective. An affidavit which does not positively and unqualifiedly represent the facts as disclosed in the affidavit to be true and within the affiant's personal knowledge is legally invalid. Humphreys v. Caldwell, 888 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. 1994) (emphasis added); see Fed. Fin. Co. v. Delgado, 1 S.W.3d 181, 184 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.). In the context of a suit on a sworn account, courts have held the verified denial required by Rule 185 must strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 93 regarding verified pleas. See Brown v. Starrett, 684 S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ); Edinburg Meat Prods. Co. v. Vernon Co., 535 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ). Rule 93, which sets forth requirements for the verification of various pleas, specifically permits some verified pleadings to be based on "information and belief." See, e.g., Tex. R. Civ. P. 93(8) (denial of the genuineness of the indorsement or assignment of a written instrument); 93(13) (denial of pleadings in appeals to the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission); 93(15) (denial of allegations in suits against automobile insurance companies). However, Rule 93(10), applicable to the denial of a sworn account, does not permit verification based on "information and belief"; rather, it requires verification unqualifiedly based on the affiant's personal knowledge. Tex. R. Civ. P. 93(10); see Gayne v. Dual-Air, Inc., 600 S.W.2d 373, 374-75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, no writ) (finding an affiant's denial of a sworn account "to the best of his knowledge" to be ineffective). The trial court did not err in ruling that the sworn denial contained in Texas Treasure's third amended answer was ineffective. 3. Trial Court's Denial of Texas Treasure's Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Answer to Christus's Counterclaim Finally, appellants argue that, even if their live sworn denial was ineffective, the trial court erred in denying them leave to file a fourth amended answer to Christus's counterclaim to contain a properly verified denial. We agree. A trial court has no discretion to refuse a party's request for leave to amend its pleadings unless: (1) the opposing party presents evidence of surprise or prejudice; or (2) the amendment asserts a new cause of action or defense, and thus is prejudicial on its face, and the opposing party objects to the amendment. Greenhalgh v. Serv. Lloyds Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex. 1990); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 63, 66. Christus asserts that "granting Texas Treasure leave to cure the defect in its verified denial would have been patently prejudicial to Christus by depriving it of the presumptive validity of (and immediate recovery on) its suit on sworn account and by requiring it to litigate the merits of that claim at considerable additional expense." Christus also claims that Texas Treasure should not be afforded more than one opportunity to correct the error in its pleadings, and that for the trial court to do so would have given Texas Treasure "a second bite at the apple." (13) These arguments, however persuasive, do not constitute "evidence of surprise or prejudice." See Greenhalgh, 787 S.W.2d at 939, 941 (finding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting plaintiff's motion to amend pleading to increase amount of damages requested, because defendant, although claiming to be "prejudiced," did not show any evidence of prejudice or surprise). Moreover, the amended pleading that Texas Treasure sought leave to file did not include any new causes of action or defenses; rather, it was seeking to correct a technical error in the wording of its verified denial to the sworn account claim. We recognize that a litigant must not be given unlimited opportunities to correct an error in its pleadings; however, we are unwilling to create an exception to the rule that surprise or prejudice to the non-moving party must be shown for a trial court to deny the moving party an opportunity to amend. See Greenhalgh, 787 S.W.2d at 939. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Texas Treasure's motion for leave to file its fourth amended answer to Christus's counterclaim to include a properly verified denial. Had the trial court permitted Texas Treasure to file a fourth amended answer to Christus's counterclaim to include an effective verified denial, Christus's suit on a sworn account would have been put at issue and summary judgment on those grounds would have been inappropriate. We find, therefore, that the trial court erred in granting Christus's summary judgment on its counterclaim on the basis of a valid suit on a sworn account without effective verified denial. We will now consider whether the trial court was justified in granting Christus's motion for summary judgment on any of the other specified grounds. B. Guarantee of Payment The trial court also awarded Christus summary judgment based on the guarantee of payment signed by Texas Treasure's human resource assistant, Paula Coots. It is undisputed that Coots was properly acting on Texas Treasure's behalf when she signed a document entitled "Guarantee of Payment (Under Section 253 of the Immigration and Nationality Act)" (hereinafter the "Guarantee") guaranteeing "to pay any and all expenses incurred or to be incurred for the hospitalization, care, and treatment, and for burial in the event of death, of the said alien crewman [Lanado]." Appellants challenge the trial court's ruling by first claiming that the Immigration and Nationality Act (the "Act"), under authority of which the Guarantee was signed, does not explicitly or implicitly create a private cause of action. Appellants are correct that the Act does not explicitly provide for a private cause of action to enforce a guarantee of payment executed pursuant to the Act. See 8 U.S.C. § 1283. (14) However, Christus did not seek to recover payment from Texas Treasure on the basis of a federal cause of action; rather, it merely sought to enforce the Guarantee as a contract. We agree with Christus that "[t]he trial court's references to the [Act] are merely intended to support the applicability and enforceability" of the Guarantee and are not intended to indicate that Christus's cause of action arose from, or was authorized by, the Act. (15) We do not, therefore, reach the issue of whether the Act implicitly provides a private right of action to enforce a guarantee of payment executed pursuant to the Act. Appellants next claim that Christus did not have standing to enforce the Guarantee because it was not a third-party beneficiary of the Guarantee. We agree. There is a legal presumption against, not in favor of, third-party beneficiary agreements, and absent any clear indication in the contract that the parties intended to confer a direct benefit to the third party, the third party may not maintain an action as a third-party beneficiary. City of Alton v. Sharyland Water Supply Corp., 145 S.W.3d 673, 682 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied) (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Tex. 1999)). The intention to contract or confer a direct benefit to a third party must be clearly and fully spelled out or enforcement by the third party must be denied. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 995 S.W.2d at 651. Moreover, the burden is on the third party seeking to enforce the agreement to show that the agreement was intended for that party's direct benefit. See German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U.S. 220, 230 (1912). The Guarantee did not mention Christus or any other health care provider by name; rather, it was a form required to be filed with the United States Department of Justice under regulations promulgated by the agency then known as the Immigration and Naturalization Service. See 8 C.F.R. § 253.1(a) (providing in part that "[t]he guarantee of payment for medical and other related expenses required by section 253 of the Act [8 U.S.C. § 1283] shall be executed by the owner, agent, consignee, commanding officer or master on Form I-510 [Guarantee of Payment]."). Christus summarily states that it is "a primary (and, at the very least, a third-party) beneficiary of the Guarantee," but Christus does not assert that the Guarantee itself contained a "clear indication" or "clearly and fully spelled out" that Christus was intended to be such a beneficiary. See City of Alton, 145 S.W.3d at 682; MCI Telecomms. Corp., 995 S.W.2d at 651. Christus therefore did not meet its burden in showing that the Guarantee was intended for its benefit, and so it did not have standing to enforce the Guarantee as a third-party beneficiary. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting Christus's summary judgment on its counterclaim on the basis of the Guarantee of Payment signed by Coots. We now turn to the final basis for Christus's summary judgment on its counterclaim as identified by the trial court. C. Texas Treasure's Duty of Maintenance and Cure The third independent ground upon which the trial court granted Christus's summary judgment was Texas Treasure's duty of maintenance and cure under general maritime law in conjunction with the assignment of benefits executed by Lanado upon her admission to Christus. (16) The doctrine of maintenance and cure, applicable in admiralty cases, provides that a seaman who is injured or becomes ill while in the service of a ship is entitled to food and lodging ("maintenance") and medical services ("cure") from the shipowner. Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962); Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Waiters, 923 S.W.2d 36, 40 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995), modified on other grounds and aff'd, 917 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. 1996). A shipowner must pay an injured or ill seaman maintenance and cure regardless of whether the shipowner was at fault or whether the ship was unseaworthy. Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1499 (5th Cir. 1995). The United States Supreme Court has summarized the policies underlying the duty as: [T]he protection of seamen, who, as a class, are poor, friendless and improvident, from the hazards of illness and abandonment while ill in foreign ports; the inducement to masters and owners to protect the safety and health of seamen while in service; the maintenance of a merchant marine for the commercial service and maritime defense of the nation by inducing men to accept employment in an arduous and perilous service. Vaughan, 369 U.S. at 531 (citing Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938)). Appellants do not dispute that Lanado is a "seaman" entitled to maintenance and cure. Appellants do assert, however, that they raised material issues of fact with respect to the extent of their liability under this doctrine, which should have precluded an award of summary judgment to Christus. Specifically, appellants claim that there are issues of material fact with respect to: (1) whether Lanado reached "maximum cure" prior to the time she was discharged from Christus; and (2) whether the charges incurred by Lanado at Christus were reasonable and necessary. 1. Maximum Cure The doctrine of maintenance and cure is limited in that the shipowner is only responsible for an injured seaman's medical expenses until such time as the seaman obtains "maximum cure." Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sphere Drake Underwriting Mgmt., Ltd., 997 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1999, pet. denied). Maximum cure is defined as that point where no further treatment will improve the condition. Waiters, 923 S.W.2d at 40. Moreover, in the case of an incapacitated seaman, maximum cure does not occur until such time as the incapacity is declared to be permanent. Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 4 (1975). To support their contention that an issue of material fact was raised with regard to maximum cure, appellants cite an affidavit executed by Joseph Varon, M.D. dated November 22, 2005, which was included as part of Texas Treasure's summary judgment evidence. This affidavit stated in relevant part as follows: "[M]ore likely than not after November 11, 2002, when Judy Lanado reached maximum improvement of her neurological condition, that she no longer required the acute care medicine services at [Christus]." Without determining whether the content of the Varon affidavit is sufficient to raise an issue of material fact with respect to maximum cure, we note that the date upon which maximum cure becomes effective is not the date in fact when no further treatment would have improved the condition; rather, it is the date on which the medical diagnosis of maximum cure is made, even if that diagnosis is made after the fact. Vella, 421 U.S. at 4. In Vella, the United States Supreme Court held that, although a seaman's injury was in fact permanent immediately after the accident, the shipowner owed maintenance and cure to the seaman up until the date when medical diagnosis of the immediate, permanent incapacity was first made by the shipowner's medical witness. Id. at 5, n.4. Here, the purported diagnosis of permanent incapacity was first made by Varon over two years after Lanado was discharged from Christus. Thus, even if Varon's affidavit were taken as true, and even if it were to suffice to show that maximum cure was reached, Texas Treasure would still have owed maintenance and cure to Lanado throughout her entire stay at Christus. Therefore, appellants have not established that there is an issue of material fact in dispute with respect to maximum cure. 2. Reasonableness of Medical Charges Another limitation to the duty of maintenance and cure is that a shipowner is liable only insofar as the medical expenses of an injured seaman are reasonable and necessary. See Waiters, 917 S.W.2d at 18; see also Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Aderhold, 240 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. 1951) (stating that "[i]n admiralty, if a defendant believes that amounts actually expended for maintenance and cure are unreasonable, he may offer rebuttal proof."). Appellants assert that their summary judgment evidence raised material issues of fact with respect to whether the charges incurred by Lanado at Christus were in fact reasonable and necessary. We agree. The summary judgment evidence produced by Christus included an affidavit signed on August 31, 2005 by William Burgin, M.D. This affidavit stated in relevant part: I was the attending physician for Ms. Lanado for the majority of her hospital admission. As such, I was one of the physicians in charge of her medical care for this hospital admission. I have personal knowledge of the medical and hospital care which was needed by Ms. Lanado, as well as the medical and hospital care which was provided to Ms. Lanado by the doctors, nurses, and other healthcare providers at [Christus] from August 21, 2002 through October 1, 2003. The medical and hospital services provided to Ms. Lanado from August 21, 2002 through October 1, 2003, as reflected in her medical records, were usual, customary, reasonable, and necessary at the time and place the services were rendered, based on Ms. Lanado's health condition and diagnoses at the time. Christus also provided an affidavit by Margaret Dippel, Director of Patient Financial Services at Christus, which accompanied Lanado's medical records at Christus detailing the $1,089,959.82 bill. The affidavit stated in relevant part: "The prices charged, as reflected in the account, are in accordance with the agreement between Judy A. Lanado and [Christus] and are the usual, customary and reasonable price for the services rendered." In response, Texas Treasure provided summary judgment evidence in the form of affidavits by Varon, as noted above, and by Harvey Cooper. Varon's affidavit stated in relevant part: "It is clear from my review of the records, that Ms. Lanado suffered brain damage unnecessarily, due to negligence, gross negligence and malpractice of her healthcare providers . . . ." Cooper's affidavit stated in relevant part: I am familiar with the Affidavit of Margaret Dippel and the invoice of [Christus] for hospital services rendered for Judy Lanado. In my experience based on my 19 years as an auditor of medical invoices, the prices charged by [Christus] are not usual, customary and reasonable prices for the services rendered. . . . In addition, I have reviewed the Affidavit of Joseph Veron, M.D. dated November 22, 2005, with respect to Judy Lanado, and Dr. Varon's opinion that she reached the maximum medical cure on November 11, 2002, and thereafter, no longer needed the level of medical services available to be provided at [Christus]. It is therefore my opinion that the charges made by [Christus] after November 11, 2002 were not reasonable or necessary. Taking Varon's and Cooper's allegations as true, see Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548-49, we conclude that appellants raised a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the reasonableness and necessity of the medical charges incurred by Judy Ann Lanado at Christus. Because there are issues of material fact in dispute with regard to the extent of appellants' liability under the maintenance and cure doctrine, the trial court erred in granting Christus's motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim on this ground. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Mowbray, 76 S.W.3d at 690; Sw. Elec. Power Co., 73 S.W.3d at 215. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Christus on all three of the grounds specified in Christus's counterclaim against Texas Treasure. Appellants' first issue is therefore sustained. V. Texas Treasure's Plea in Intervention (17) By their second issue, appellants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment, and in granting Christus's motion for summary judgment, with respect to the claims raised in Texas Treasure's plea in intervention. (18) In its amended plea in intervention, Texas Treasure claimed that it was entitled to a declaratory judgment that it is equitably subrogated to the Lanados' rights under their settlement agreement with Christus, and that it was entitled as a matter of law to a declaratory judgment stating that it is not responsible for paying Lanado's hospital bill. (19) A. Equitable Subrogation Equitable subrogation "is a legal fiction" whereby "an obligation, extinguished by a payment made by a third person, is treated as still subsisting for the benefit of this third person, so that by means of it one creditor is substituted to the rights, remedies, and securities of another." First Nat'l Bank of Houston v. Ackerman, 8 S.W. 45, 47 (Tex. 1888); see also Murray v. Cadle Co., No. 05-06-01481-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1662, at *8 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 6, 2008, no pet. h.). Equitable subrogation, unlike contractual subrogation, "does not depend on a contract but arises in every instance in which one person, not acting voluntarily, has paid a debt for which another was primarily liable and which in equity should have been paid by the latter." Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765, 774 (Tex. 2007). The rationale for this rule is that the insured would otherwise recover twice, a result that "the law refuses to sanction." Ortiz v. Great S. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 587 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 597 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1980). The burden is on the party claiming equitable subrogation to establish he is entitled to it. Monk v. Dallas Brake & Clutch Serv. Co., 697 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In the instant case, the settlement agreement executed by the Lanados and Christus provided specifically that Lanado's hospital bill remained outstanding. (20) Moreover, the agreement provided that the Lanados assigned to Christus her rights under the doctrine of maintenance and cure. (21) As such, there is no risk that, absent action by the trial court, the Lanados would recover twice. We therefore conclude that appellants did not establish that they are entitled to be equitably subrogated to the Lanados' rights under the settlement agreement. The trial court did not err in denying Texas Treasure's motion for summary judgment or granting Christus's motion for summary judgment on this basis. B. Declaratory Judgment In response to Texas Treasure's petition for declaratory judgment, Christus contended that Texas Treasure is responsible for Lanado's entire hospital bill, and is not entitled to indemnification or reimbursement in the case of any intervening negligence on the part of Christus. In support of this argument, Christus relies on Houston Belt & Terminal Railway Co. v. Burmester, 309 S.W.2d 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1957, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In that case, Burmester, an alien seaman, was injured on shore when the vehicle he was riding in collided with an engine owned and operated by a third party. Id. at 272. Burmester's employer paid his medical expenses pursuant to the doctrine of maintenance and cure. Id. at 277. When Burmester filed a suit for negligence against the third party that owned and operated the engine, his employer intervened, seeking to recover its maintenance and cure payments from the third party. Id. Our sister court, recognizing that "the laws of the state in which the injury occurred [are] applicable," found that Burmester's employer had no right of indemnity with respect to Burmester's rights. Christus urges us to follow Burmester and conclude that appellants are not entitled to any indemnification or reimbursement for that portion of Lanado's hospital expenses that may have been the result of Christus's negligence. We are not inclined to do so. Although neither party was able to direct us to any Texas case of more recent vintage than the half-century-old Burmester, the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly since held that a shipowner required to pay maintenance and cure may recover those payments from a third party who caused the injury, even when the employee has already settled with that third party. See, e.g., Bertram v. Freeport McMoran, Inc., 35 F.3d 1008, 1017 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that "an employer's right to recovery over for maintenance and cure is not negated by a settlement by the injured employee with the third-party tortfeasor."); Adams v. Texaco, Inc., 640 F.2d 618, 620 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that the underlying rationale for granting the shipowner indemnity "is that the burden of maintenance and cure should be borne by the tortfeasor, not an innocent shipowner."); Savoie v. Lafourche Boat Rentals, Inc., 627 F.2d 722, 722 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that "a seaman's innocent employer is entitled to reimbursement from a third party for maintenance and cure payments made necessary by the third party's negligence."); Tri-State Oil Tool Indus., Inc. v. Delta Marine Drilling Co., 410 F.2d 178, 186 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating that "[i]t would be wrong to assess damages against a non-negligent or passively negligent shipowner for loss or injury suffered solely as a result of active negligence of another party, regardless of the absence of a contractual relationship between the parties."). We conclude that, although it is undisputed that appellants remain liable for Lanado's hospital expenses under the doctrine of maintenance and cure, they are entitled to declaratory judgment that they are not responsible for paying the amount, if any, of the hospital bill that was attributable to Christus's negligence. See, e.g., Bertram, 35 F.3d at 1017; Adams, 640 F.2d at 620; Savoie, 627 F.2d at 722 Tri-State Oil Tool Indus., Inc., 410 F.2d at 186. We remand to the trial court to determine the questions of: (1) whether Christus was in fact negligent; and (2) how much, if any, of Lanado's hospital expenses were attributable to such negligence. Because there are issues of material fact in dispute with respect to the extent of appellants' liability, the trial court should have denied both Christus's and Texas Treasure's motions for summary judgment with respect to Texas Treasure's petition for declaratory judgment. (22) See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); FM Props., 22 S.W.3d at 872; Warrantech, 210 S.W.3d at 765. Appellants' second issue is therefore sustained in part and overruled in part. VI. Appellants' Due Process Claims By their third issue, appellants contend that the trial court denied their constitutional due process rights: (1) by denying their motion for leave to file a fourth amended answer to Christus's counterclaim to include an effective verified denial; and (2) by only partially granting their motion for leave to file a response to Christus's unserved Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment. We disagree. A. Motion for Leave to File Fourth Amended Answer to Christus's Counterclaim As discussed above, the trial court denied the appellants' motion for leave to file a fourth amended answer to Christus's counterclaim to include a properly verified denial of Christus's suit on a sworn account. Appellants cite In re Marriage of Richards, 991 S.W.2d 32, 37-38 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1999, pet. dism'd), for the proposition that the trial court's ruling deprived them of their right to due process of law. In Richards, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the trial court's putative attempt to decide factual issues without giving one party the opportunity to respond would violate due process. Id. However, in denying Texas Treasure's motion for leave to file a fourth amended answer, the trial court was not deciding any particular fact issue; rather, it was exercising its discretion to determine whether Texas Treasure should be given another opportunity to correct its pleadings. Although, as discussed above, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Texas Treasure this opportunity, appellants do not cite any authority indicating that such an error in discretion would deprive appellants of their constitutional due process rights. We find that this argument has been inadequately briefed and therefore waived. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h). B. Motion for Leave to Respond to Christus's Unserved Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment Appellants also argue that the trial court deprived them of their due process rights by only partially granting, in the May 26, 2006 final judgment, Texas Treasure's motion for leave to file a response to Christus's unserved Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment. To support their argument that the trial court "fail[ed] to allow [Texas Treasure] a meaningful opportunity to reply," the appellants point to two "new claims" which they contend were first raised in Christus's Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment. First, appellants assert that the claim regarding Lanado's alleged assignment of benefits to Christus was raised for the first time in Christus's Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment and that the lack of an opportunity for appellants to respond to this claim constituted a deprivation of their due process rights. However, the record reflects that Christus asserted this claim previously in their second amended counterclaim. Moreover, the document allegedly assigning benefits to Christus had been included as an exhibit in Christus's prior motion for summary judgment on Texas Treasure's plea in intervention. Therefore, it was not a violation of appellants' due process rights for the trial court to have denied their request for leave to file a response to this claim, as appellants were able to so respond earlier in the proceedings but chose not to. (23) Second, appellants contend that Christus's Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment included an affidavit regarding attorney's fees signed by Christus's trial counsel John S. Langley, which did not appear in Christus's prior motions for summary judgment. While it is true that the Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment included this new affidavit evidence, the trial court specifically granted Texas Treasure the opportunity to respond with respect to the attorney's fees issue and did not rule on that issue until after considering Texas Treasure's response. We therefore conclude that any error committed by the trial court in denying Texas Treasure the opportunity to respond to Christus's Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment was harmless error. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1. Appellants' third issue is overruled. VII. Conclusion We affirm that portion of the trial court's judgment denying Texas Treasure's motion for summary judgment on its plea in intervention. We reverse that portion of the trial court's judgment granting Christus's motions for summary judgment on its counterclaim and on Texas Treasure's plea in intervention, and we remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. _______________________ DORI CONTRERAS GARZA, Justice Opinion delivered and filed this the 17th day of April, 2008. 1. A "disponent owner" of a vessel is a person or company which has commercial control over a vessel's operation without owning the ship as in a "bareboat charter." M-i-link.com Maritime Dictionary, available at http://www.m-i-link.com/dictionary/default.asp?term=bareboat+charter (last visited Apr. 17, 2008). A "bareboat charter" is a type of charter in which the shipowner provides only the ship and gives the charterer--in this case, Day Cruises Maritime, L.L.C.--complete control, management and operation of the vessel for the agreed leasing period. Id. 2. Jasper Lanado originally brought suit in his capacity as permanent guardian of Judy Ann Lanado and as next friend of Judy's two minor daughters, Joyze Ann Danielle Lanado and Mitze Franchette Lanado. The record also reflects that at some point thereafter, Judy Ann Lanado's mother, Anunciacion Sierra, also became a named plaintiff. The plaintiffs will be referred to collectively as "the Lanados." 3. Christus filed an amended counterclaim against Texas Treasure on December 31, 2003. The amended counterclaim was Christus's active pleading at the time that the trial court granted its motion for summar judgment. However, we will refer here to Christus's amended counterclaim as its "counterclaim" for purposes of convenience. 4. As discussed fully herein, general maritime law provides that a shipowner must pay "maintenance and cure" to a seaman who is injured or becomes ill while in the service of a ship. Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Waiters, 917 S.W.2d 17, 18 (Tex. 1996) (citing Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 529 (1961) and Guevara v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 59 F.3d 1496, 1499 (5th Cir. 1995)). The injured or ill seaman is entitled to maintenance and cure benefits regardless of whether the shipowner was at fault. Waiters, 917 S.W.2d at 18. 5. Neither party advises this Court of the exact amount(s) which Christus agreed to pay the Lanados pursuant to their settlement agreement. Moreover, the dollar amounts of the settlement are redacted in the copy of the agreement in the record that is referenced by Christus. 6. Christus notes that this assignment was merely a "ratification" of Lanado's earlier assignment of her maintenance and cure benefits to Christus as evidenced by the "Release of Information and Assignment of Health Insurance Benefits" that Lanado signed upon her admission to Christus. 7. The trial court entered written interlocutory orders on April 27, 2004, denying Texas Treasure's motion for summary judgment, and on May 3, 2004, granting Christus's motion for summary judgment as to all of Texas Treasure's affirmative claims for relief. 8. Christus notes correctly that the document with which Texas Treasure was not served was actually entitled "Counter-Plaintiff Christus Spohn Health System's Reply to Response of Intervenors [Texas Treasure] to Motion for Summary Judgment of Christus on Counterclaim Against Intervenors and Christus'[s] Supplement to Motion for Summary Judgment." For brevity's sake, we will refer to this document as Christus's "Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment." 9. Texas Treasure also filed an Objection to Entry of Judgment, contending that the trial court should not enter a judgment based on its ruling at the hearing of March 3, 2006, until such time as Texas Treasure's response to Christus's Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment could be considered. This was granted by the trial court at the hearing of May 3, 2006. 10. The May 26, 2006 final judgment also memorialized the trial court's previous rulings: (1) denying Texas Treasure's motion for leave to file its fourth amended answer to Christus's counterclaim; (2) denying Texas Treasure's motion for sanctions; (3) partially granting Texas Treasure's motion for leave to file a response to Christus's Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment; and (4) granting Texas Treasure's Objection to Entry of Judgment. 11. We note that appellants filed their notice of appeal on August 24, 2006, which was prior to the date that we consider the trial court's judgment to have become final. Appellants' notice of appeal was therefore prematurely filed. However, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 27.1(a) provides that "[i]n a civil case, a prematurely filed notice of appeal is effective and deemed filed on the day of, but after, the event that begins the period for perfecting the appeal." Tex. R. App. P. 27.1(a). Appellants' notice of appeal is therefore deemed to have been filed on September 14, 2006, after the trial court entered its order of severance with respect to Florida Day Cruises, Inc. 12. On appeal, Christus refers to a document entitled "Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean Going Vessels," which included a provision that the employer of an injured or ill seaman shall be liable for the full cost of the seaman's hospital and medical expenses. However, because Christus provided no evidence that these "Standard Terms and Conditions" were actually applicable to Lanado's employment with Texas Treasure, we do not consider this to be a valid basis upon which Christus's summary judgment may have been granted. 13. In support of this argument, Christus notes that Texas Treasure was previously permitted to file a second amended answer to Christus's counterclaim for the express purpose of adding an effective verified denial. After Christus amended its counterclaim, however, Texas Treasure responded by filing a third amended answer which contained the defective denial. 14. Section 1283 of Title 8 of the United States Code provides: § 1283. Hospital treatment of alien crewmen afflicted with certain diseases. An alien crewman, including an alien crewman ineligible for a conditional permit to land under section 1282(a) of this title, who is found on arrival in a port of the United States to be afflicted with any of the disabilities or diseases mentioned in section 1285 of this title, shall be placed in a hospital designated by the immigration officer in charge at the port of arrival and treated, all expenses connected therewith, including burial in the event of death, to be borne by the owner, agent, consignee, commanding officer, or master of the vessel or aircraft, and not to be deducted from the crewman's wages. No such vessel or aircraft shall be granted clearance until such expenses are paid, or their payment appropriately guaranteed, and the collector of customs is so notified by the immigration officer in charge. An alien crewman suspected of being afflicted with any such disability or disease may be removed from the vessel or aircraft on which he arrived to an immigration station, or other appropriate place, for such observation as will enable the examining surgeons to determine definitely whether or not he is so afflicted, all expenses connected therewith to be borne in the manner hereinbefore prescribed. In cases in which it appears to the satisfaction of the immigration officer in charge that it will not be possible within a reasonable time to effect a cure, the return of the alien crewman shall be enforced on, or at the expense of, the transportation line on which he came, upon such conditions as the Attorney General shall prescribe, to insure that the alien shall be properly cared for and protected, and that the spread of contagion shall be guarded against. 8 U.S.C. § 1283. 15. We further note that section 253 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1283) does not appear to be applicable to Judy Ann Lanado's injuries. As discussed above, that section applies only to alien crewmen who are "found on arrival in a port of the United States to be afflicted with any of the disabilities or diseases mentioned in section 1285. Id. The conditions mentioned in section 1285 are "feeble-mindedness, insanity, epilepsy, tuberculosis in any form, leprosy, or any dangerous contagious disease." 8 U.S.C. § 1285. It is undisputed that Lanado suffered from none of these conditions. 16. Appellants claim that the assignment of benefits executed by Lanado upon her admission to Christus was ineffective because "[p]ersonal injury claims are not assignable in admiralty cases." Without reaching the merits of this argument, we note that appellants failed to assert this argument in its response to Christus's motion for summary judgment; rather, it was asserted for the first time in Texas Treasure's motion for new trial. Therefore, the argument has been waived. See Garrod Invs., Inc. v. Schlegel, 139 S.W.3d 759, 765 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.) (stating that "[a]ny issue which the non-movant claims would justify denying summary judgment must be included in its response" to the motion for summary judgment); see also Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1). 17. Although the judgment on appeal here did not explicitly incorporate the trial court's prior orders denying Texas Treasure's motion for summary judgment and granting Christus's motion for summary judgment with respect to the claims raised in Texas Treasure's plea in intervention, we note that the final judgment did state that it was "final, disposes of all claims and parties, and is appealable." 18. Appellants and Christus agree that while general maritime law governs the rights of Lanado with respect to her employer's duty of maintenance and cure, Texas law governs the question of whether appellants have a right of equitable subrogation or indemnity against Lanado or Christus. See Gauthier v. Crosby Marine Serv., Inc., 752 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that "a shipowner's right to indemnity against a land-locked physician who negligently treats a patient injured at sea is governed by state law"). 19. Appellants also asserted that they are entitled to summary judgment on their plea in intervention pursuant to the "circuity of action" doctrine. This doctrine provides that a plaintiff's cause of action will be extinguished when, as the result of indemnification obligations or settlement agreements between the parties, a plaintiff would end up indemnifying another party for its own original claim. Refinery Holding Co., L.P. v. TRMI Holdings, Inc. (In re El Paso Refinery, L.P.), 302 F.3d 343, 349-350 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Phillips Pipe Line Co. v. McKown, 580 S.W.2d 4335, 440 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). Both appellants and Christus agree, however, that this doctrine applies if and only if Texas Treasure had a right of equitable subrogation with respect to the Lanados' rights under their settlement agreement with Christus. Because we find that Texas Treasure had no such right of equitable subrogation, as discussed herein, we conclude that the circuity of action doctrine does not apply. 20. Specifically, the agreement stated in part as follows: The parties agree that this acknowledgment, satisfaction and assignment as full satisfaction of the outstanding medical and hospital expenses Judy Ann Lanado incurred while a patient at [Christus] is not [to] be construed as forgiveness of the said hospital bill or that any amount paid to Judy Ann Lanado includes the payment of the said hospital bill. [Christus] is agreeing to stand in the place of Judy Ann Lanado by way of assignment and look to her Employer(s) for satisfaction of the hospital bill. 21. Specifically, the agreement stated in part as follows: . . . I, Jasper Lanado, individually, and on behalf of Judy Ann Lanado, as her lawful guardian, do hereby assign, grant and convey to [Christus] any and all claims, benefits and any rights, title and interest in those claims and benefits, Judy Ann Lanado had, has, or may have as beneficiary against her Employer(s) for the medical and hospital expenses she incurred while a patient at [Christus]. This assignment conveys to [Christus] all the rights and powers of collection granted to Judy A. Lanado under the maritime laws of the United States of America and/or the laws of the State of Texas. 22. Appellants state in their reply brief as follows: "Appellants may not ultimately recover 100% of the subrogation claim, but they should not be foreclosed from doing so as a matter of law. The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the case remanded for trial." With this statement, appellants appear to recognize that, even if the trial court had acknowledged their right to be equitably subrogated to the Lanados' recovery from Christus, this would not extinguish all disputes as to material fact issues so as to warrant the granting of Texas Treasure's summary judgment. 23. As discussed above, the trial court also denied Texas Treasure's motion for sanctions stemming from the fact that it was not served with Christus's Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment. However, appellants do not challenge this ruling in their appeal; therefore, we do not address the issue here. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1; Martinez v. El Paso County, 218 S.W.3d 841, 844 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2007, pet. dism'd) ("When reviewing a civil matter, an appellate court has no discretion to consider an issue not raised in the appellant's brief. . .").

What is Universal Health Services, Inc. (UHS),? medicaid @$600 per month per person......

Alan B. Miller is chairman of the board, president and chief executive officer of Universal Health Services, Inc. (UHS), the organization he founded in 1978. UHS is now one of the largest proprietary hospital management companies in the nation. Headquartered in King of Prussia, PA, UHS owns and operates over 100 facilities across the country and in Puerto Rico, with revenues of approximately $4.0 billion.

A respected leader of the healthcare industry, Mr. Miller has gained national recognition as an authority on hospital management, having formulated positions on healthcare policy that have affected national legislation. He has served as a healthcare advisor to the federal government and is a frequent guest speaker for healthcare and business seminars. In April 1999, he was presented with the first Lifetime Achievement Award from the Federation of American Health Systems.

Before establishing UHS, Mr. Miller served as chairman and president of American Medicorp (NYSE) from 1973 to 1978. He also founded and served as first chairman of H.U.G. Ltd., an industry mutual insurance company providing malpractice insurance to hospitals nationwide.

Mr. Miller is a graduate of the College of William & Mary in Virginia, and earned an MBA from the Wharton School of the University of Pennyslvania where he serves on the Board of Overseers. Mr. Miller was named Master Entrepreneur of the Year in 1991, an award sponsored by Ernst & Young and Merrill Lynch. In 1992, Financial World Magazine honored him as CEO of the Year in Hospital Management, and in 1995 and 1996 Financial World named him among the Outstanding 100 CEOs nationally.

TLR~ Stentoric Banking on non suit if u r against "ball removal abuse"

Local
Motion by Spohn denied a third time

By Heather Ann White (Contact)
Saturday, August 4, 2007
Slough was abducted Sept. 11, 2005, and found dead a day later.
Slough was abducted Sept. 11, 2005, and found dead a day later.
Local News

CORPUS CHRISTI — The Texas Supreme Court denied an emergency motion filed by the Christus Spohn Health System to stop a civil trial involving the kidnapping and murder of a nurse.

The Supreme Court posted its decision on its Web site Friday. This was the hospital's last chance at stopping the trial, in which attorneys for the family of nurse Debra Slough allege that the hospital was negligent in providing security.

Slough was abducted from a Christus Spohn Hospital Shoreline parking lot Sept. 11, 2005, and her body was found a day later in rural Bee County. Jesus Alvarez, who pleaded guilty to Slough's murder, is serving life in prison and is not eligible for parole.

A civil suit was filed in December 2005 on behalf of the Slough family, and the trial is scheduled for Aug. 13.

The Supreme Court's decision did not include an explanation on the Web site. The court typically does not post such information, a court clerk said.

Lawyers representing the hospital system have asked for arbitration in the case in County Court-at-Law No. 4 Judge James Klager's court, which he denied. The hospital system then filed motions with the 13th Court of Appeals asking for arbitration and was denied again.

"I think that Spohn's last hope of avoiding this trial is over," said Robert Hilliard, lead attorney for the Slough family. "We're going to trial on Aug. 13 and a jury is going to decide what's going to happen."

Calls to Spohn attorneys were not returned Friday.

Contact Heather Ann White at 886-3794 or whiteh@caller.com

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Posted by bluegalcc on August 4, 2007 at 7:15 a.m. (Suggest removal)

why would spohn think they had the right to arbitration? does anyone know?

Posted by g1r8c7c6 on August 4, 2007 at 7:50 a.m. (Suggest removal)

They seem to be trying to do everything from withholding evidence to creating an arbitration clause for injured families who dare question Spohn's actions. Enough already, either settle the case or let a jury decide.

Posted by sylarispe on August 4, 2007 at 7:58 a.m. (Suggest removal)

It is a shame that a so called religious medical institution could attempt to deny their negligence in this case by subverting the legal process. What happened to "I am my brothers keeper"?

Posted by claudedunger on August 4, 2007 at 7:59 a.m. (Suggest removal)

No one should be afraid of a jury, unless.....

Posted by jofelein on August 4, 2007 at 8 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Most all employer-employee disputes these days are handled through arbitration, due to clauses in employment and/or employee benefit contracts.

It's not necessarily a bad thing. Employee plaintiffs can usually count on getting money, but employer defendants don't run the risk of a runaway jury. It also keeps litigation expenses down, because the process isn't usually so drawn out.

Also, you can't usually appeal an award in arbitration. Whatever is awarded has to be paid pretty quickly. However, if the jury in this case awards damages, the family could still have to wait years to learn if they will really see a dime, because appeals can go on for a long time.

Posted by dannoynted1 on August 4, 2007 at 8:05 a.m. (Suggest removal)

The Nuns are not there anymore.

Posted by markdicarlo on August 4, 2007 at 8:37 a.m. (Suggest removal)

The newspaper does not mention whether of not the attorneys for the hospital should be sanctioned for untimely filing what would appear to be a series of frivolous defenses to the lawsuit. Had the attorneys representing the deceased's family filed a series of such motions the newpaper would have been up in arms with the angle or spin that the lawsuit is frivolous.
Arbitration is nothing more than a tactic to deprive people their right to a fair jury trial.

Posted by magnumto on August 4, 2007 at 8:45 a.m. (Suggest removal)

I suspect Spohn will try to settle out of court now. They sure seem worried about leaving this in a jury's hands.

Posted by sunny76daz on August 4, 2007 at 8:50 a.m. (Suggest removal)

dannoynted1 -- just wanted to make sure you know you are wrong with your statement.....

Sisters of Charity Health Care and Incarnet Word Health system merged in 1999 to become one.. CHRISTUS Health. If you notice.. it is not just SPOHN, it is CHRISTUS HEALTH SPOHN HOSPTIAL.. Since then the "nuns" are still VERY present in the operations of Spohn.

Take a look at thier website.. or better yet, look at the Leadship at Spohn. There are 2 Sister on the Board of Directors for Spohn, and 1 Executive Leadership - Sister Carol Ann Jokerst who is the Vice President of Mission Effecitve for CHRISTUS Spohn Health System.

Belive me, I am not giving an opinion in this case becuase I choose not to share, but make sure you know the reality of an organization before making comments about it. Thanks!

Posted by padreman1019 on August 4, 2007 at 9:09 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Another case of a ridiculous law suit against an institution that can't afford such. Why would a hospital be responsible for someone abducted in their parking lot? It's always somebody else's fault when bad things happen and somebody has to pay. Makes the family look bad to me.

Posted by muffin on August 4, 2007 at 9:27 a.m. (Suggest removal)

padreman1019 - congratulations!

It's nice to see that common sense still survives in todays world where "Lawsuit Lotto" has become so common. Too bad you won't be on the jury.

I feel for the Lady's family. There's no way I can understand their pain but I can recognize that no amount of "MONEY" can ever compensate for their loss, certainly not when it comes from a source which shares no complicity in the crime committed against them...

Posted by jerry.rios on August 4, 2007 at 10:11 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Padreman1019...a landowner can be held responsible for dangerous conditions that injure another on his property.

Its not as simple as bad things happening on the property. The family's lawyer will have to show that Spohn knew of previous crime occurring on the property and that they did nothing to protect the employees in the particular parking lot. This is failure to act reasonably.

If Spohn knew of car burglaries or muggings happening in the parking lot around the same time of night as this victim was abducted, yet never increased security or installed additional lighting or did anything to make the lot safer, they would have some responsibility. The lawyer would need to prove all of this.

Hope this helps.

Posted by jlopezandfamily52 on August 4, 2007 at 10:41 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Again big business trying to shun their responsibilites! My wife and I were involved in a bad accident this year and we were treated at Spohn Mem. Thankfully, they did save my wife's life, however, we lost a $200 watch in the ER, they failed to diagnose or treat a ruptured eardrum on my wife, they failed to address her loss of smell or taste, and they said my knee was fine, after I complained about it daily. Come to find out, I had a torn ACL, a half torn MCL and a broken fibula. Who will hold this hospital accountable??? If there is a lawyer interested in this, write me please.

Posted by rosemart66 on August 4, 2007 at 12:37 p.m. (Suggest removal)

..."In its denial, the court of appeals said the health system didn't request arbitration in a timely manner and also led opposing counsel and the plaintiffs to believe there would be a trial in the case stemming from the slaying of Debra Slough...."

Spohn should have filed request sooner - why did they / their attorney's wait so long...the above info is from a previous caller times article...

Posted by jkobus on August 4, 2007 at 12:45 p.m. (Suggest removal)

does this mean that any employer would be responsible for terrible things that happen to thier employees after work? yes, this was a tragedy but how could the hospital be responsible???? everything has to be a lawsuite today, sure do wonder if these suites could have anything to do with rising prices on just about everything

Posted by kspcm01 on August 4, 2007 at 3:23 p.m. (Suggest removal)

While this case certainly reeks of lawsuit abuse, the Christus Spohn Health System does NOT have the right to stop the civil trial. Even though a competent jury is sometimes difficult to acquire (the old joke being that many jurists are simply not "smart enough" or "motivated" to GET OUT of jury duty), the fact remains that a defendent should not have the right to end a trial.

That being said, it astounds me to think that the hospital can be found economically liable for the actions of an intruder. What sort of precedent will this set?

What if an individual drives into a Whataburger and is found guilty of intentionally running over a cashier? Would Whataburger be economically liable for such a crime? The impact of a guilty verdict would have expensive ramification across Texas and the rest of the United States.

Sadly, there are enough dumb people out there who would hold any "big" business liable in favor of "regular folks." How many frivolous lawsuits have plagued our courts in the last few years?

:<

Posted by micmiller97 on August 4, 2007 at 4 p.m. (Suggest removal)

sunny76daz - thank you for correcting the errouneous information that Padreman1019 had. As you, I want to make a comment but not share anymore than necessary.

jlopezandfamily52 - if you want to sue - sue the doctor - they are independents from the hospital and that is who missed your diagnosis. You cannot blame the nurses or a hospital for the diagnosis of a doctor who is an independent contractor. But just remember that these lawsuits also drive even the good doctors out of the area. You are also given a statement of your rights upon admission and it states that you can deny being discharged if you feel that you are not up to standards of going home. You should hvae voiced your opinion before you and your wife were discharged.

If property owners can be sued for what happens on their property, then both Wal-Mart and Target are open for lawsuits for those that have been abducted from their parking lots.

Posted by visuallink on August 4, 2007 at 9:38 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Alvarez had been on their property for over 6 hours lurking around the building before Debbie got abducted. Wal-Mart andTarget have security driving around every 5 minutes, and have a security guard parked in the very back of the parking lot watching everything. It's funny, not only was there only 3 security guards on the clock that day for that huge huge complex, but they couldn't even notice a gang banger from his looks, and didn't even know that he had been on the property stalking everyone trying to find a victim for half the morning.

To top it off, IT HAPPEND DURING THE DAYTIME! HELLOOOO! NO SECURITY SAW HIM? IT WAS THAT POOR! HE WAS INSIDE, OUTSIDE AND ALL AROUND THE BUILDING REPEATEDLY! THIS HAPPEND AT 3PM!!!

You people can say its lawsuit abuse all you want, but all of you are so wrong. Money can't compensate for the loss over Debbie, but it can sure bring some happyness. The money isnt suppose to compensate for a loss, it's suppose to bring a little happyness back into their lives to compensate for the pain that they are going through right now due to the loss that could have been prevented if security wasn't so poor in the work environment.

None of you people are in the position that the Slough's are in, so you shouldn't be running your mouths as if you know what they are going through right now because it's worse than anyone can possibly imagine.

Spohn hid a survalence tape..and denied having it over 17 times. What makes everyone think that they never had documented recordings of stalkings being on the premises? You all believe that? There was people coming foward saying they were being stalked, and even reported it. Spohn could have just burned all those documents and said they never had anything. It's easy to do. They hid the video tape didn't they? Inside the true court is where everything spills, the judge knows more of whats going on than any of you do because thats where its all being explained. They were sanctioned, and they couldn't even write a correct check.

Posted by vivian_r on August 4, 2007 at 10:03 p.m. (Suggest removal)

For all of you who think Spohn is so good to it's employees I dare you to go apply for a job there and if you are unfortunate enough to get hired lets see how long you will put up with the B.S. they sling.

Spohn is the Anti Christ they no more belive that mission statemet of theirs than the man in the moon.

Security is lax that has already been proven by the guy hanging out in the garage for 6 hours. The security room is on the other side of the E.R. they have cameras there but half the time the place is empty. Why because security is either feeding their faces or trying to pick up nurses.

One security gaurd in particular is the worst he thinks he is God's gift to women and will hang out at nurses stations nearly half of his shift. I have seen it I worked there and even reported him.

Posted by tktamez on August 4, 2007 at 10:52 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Vivian is right about the security. You ask them to walk you to your car and they either complain in a NICE way, or want to know your personal business. Come on now, it's well known by the employees by now. I still don't feel safe in that parking garage. They always say that it's not a city matter when something happens out there, so the employees don't call 911. So if it's their private property, then they are responsible for what happens on it. They can't have it both ways. They don't want city police to help, then they ARE responsible. If they don't want to be responsible, then shut down the parking lot to visitors, and make their VALET parking people park every dang car that pulls up. Then the visiters can just stand outside the garage and wait for the valet to bring their car to them. Maybe the judge will order mandatory valet parking for Spohn visitors. Then the security will only have to look for someone breaking in the cars, but at least we won't have to worry about one of our co-workers getting killed again

Posted by visuallink on August 5, 2007 at 5:43 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Also, Don't even say an institution such as Spohn can't afford to pay up. In 2006, the non-profit organization Christus Health made up to 1.6 Billion dollars in profit. That is over 999,999,999 million...What the Slough's are suing for isn't even a big chunk of that profit that they made, maybe no more than 2-3% of that?

Posted by robertnsheri on August 5, 2007 at 3:52 p.m. (Suggest removal)

To Visuallink:

The man was on the hospital premises for over 4 hours. (Posted by visuallink on July 21, 2007 at 10:09 p.m)
Alvarez had been on their property for over 6 hours lurking around the building before Debbie got abducted. (Posted by visuallink on August 4, 2007 at 9:38 p.m.)

So which is it? Funny how people exaggerate the truth or just make assumptions.

"but they couldn't even notice a gang banger from his looks..." (Posted by visuallink on August 4, 2007 at 9:38 p.m.)
So are you making that assumption because he is hispanic, shaved head, with tattoos?
Also, money will never bring true happiness....happiness lies within the person.

To Vivian_r:

If you’re that disgruntled about working at Spohn, maybe you should seek counseling. I'm not trying to be rude but I've seen some of your postings and just thought that maybe counseling would help.

To Tktamez:

Are you serious about valet? Do you know how many people have complained that they have stuff missing? Also, valet workers have wrecked vehicles while trying to park them. I wouldn't want them to park my vehicle for sure!

Posted by visuallink on August 6, 2007 at 1:40 a.m. (Suggest removal)

You are such an idiot, Alvarez admitted how long he had been on the Hospital when he got caught.. I don't make assumptions, I am very close with the Slough's. You aren't.

And yes, someone looking like that lurking around for 4 hours is not hard to miss.

Posted by dannoynted1 on August 6, 2007 at 4:18 a.m. (Suggest removal)

sunny76daz~ I was responding to

sylarispe
"It is a shame that a so called religious medical institution could attempt to deny their negligence in this case by subverting the legal process. What happened to "I am my brothers keeper"?"

So i said: The Nuns are not there anymore.

Then you say:

dannoynted1 -- just wanted to make sure you know you are wrong with your statement.....

Sisters of Charity Health Care and Incarnet Word Health system merged in 1999 to become one.. CHRISTUS Health. If you notice.. it is not just SPOHN, it is CHRISTUS HEALTH SPOHN HOSPTIAL.. Since then the "nuns" are still VERY present in the operations of Spohn.

Well how come they are not visible?
Spohn Hospital was established by Arther & his wife Sarah Josephine Kenedy Spohn prior to both these charities and these charities are viable thanks to the very generous gifts they have received through the generosity of the Kenedy Family.

Why are these nuns not visiting the teenage mothers having babies in this hospital?

I am sure if they were big donors to the Diocese, the Bishop himself would be there during visiting hour.

The only nuns I see belong to neither of these organizations you mentioned.

BTW~You spelled Incarnate incorrectly.

And I know all about IWA my mother's family went to that school all their life till college. When the nuns were the teachers

Posted by dannoynted1 on August 6, 2007 at 4:26 a.m. (Suggest removal)

The main problem with this lawsuit is that the attorneys for the hospital withheld crucial evidence, denied it's existence and then now claims that if this was "Dick Chaney or Whittington" they would have promptly turned over these security TAPES!

Why pay for video surveillance and then deny it?

Either you were lying when you told the insurance company you had it or in order to cut costs you lied.

But they do have it and if it were the Bishop this would not have happened at all!

Security cameras are there for this very reason and to not disclose this information is a travesty of justice.

Posted by narc on August 6, 2007 at 9:06 a.m. (Suggest removal)

where is the common sense with you people? If I were a business owner I would get rid of my security so I won't get sued.

Posted by rramos4us on August 6, 2007 at 12:43 p.m. (Suggest removal)

I really agree with visuallink. This is a great loss to the family. The hospital needs to stop hidding the truth and start paying up. This will be appealed for sure all because of the security is lame. Also, because this family is going to get payied. I hope they really get some money after this cover up. Shame on you Spohn. That hospital is so going to have to pay.

Posted by jsneed on August 6, 2007 at 12:49 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Who is to say what is right in this case. Increased security measures lead to decreased freedoms and increased cost which lead to higher prices for all of us.

The police rarely get to protect anyone during a violent crime. Most criminals eventually get caught, so the protection is by virtue of enforcing laws, not by beeing superheros.

Courthouses, schools, hospitals, stadiums, hotels, and large company complexes usually have some form of security and surveilence. This is only a deterent. Don't forget about the girl abducted at Target. The cameras helped find the killer, but they did not protect the girl.

I don't know enough about the case to comment on the particulars. I just wanted to remind everyone that more laws and security may not be the answer. This lawsuit will not protect anybody in the future. You will still have to take care of yourself and loved ones as best as possible and allways be mindful of your surroundings.

Posted by arodriguez on August 6, 2007 at 2:01 p.m. (Suggest removal)

I agree with jsneed. I dont think that this lawsuit is going to solve anything either. I am deeply sorry for their loss, but this lawsuit will not bring her back. Like jsneed said it will only bring higher cost for us all. No one is required to have cameras they do it as an extra in hopes that it will bring down crime. Just think about it what about all these robberies at these convenience stores do you think the convenient store is to blame for what happens? The answer is NO it is neither the store nor the employees fault for what happens it is the one that chose to do the crime. The only thing the cameras and security do is to possibly help in preventing it, it does not mean it will never happen or that it guarantees that it will not happen.

Posted by narc on August 6, 2007 at 2:32 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Well said arodriquez, we live in a dangerous world and we need to be cautious at all times. This was an awful tragedy and no amount of money will make it right, but I hope when this is all done their family will find some peace and closure.

Posted by southwestaustin on August 6, 2007 at 3:02 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Predators have always known that a hospital parking lot is a great place to stake out their next victim. Why? Because of the large percentage of female nurses. If a psycho could figure this out, then a corporation like Spohn Hospital should have too. There have been so many movies about nurses being preyed upon by various types of criminals. It only makes sense that they are vulnerable to all sorts of weirdos.

Posted by grimjack41 on August 6, 2007 at 3:32 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Law suit abuse pure and simple. Then people wonder why you have to go to San Antonio or other cities to find a "good doctor".....

In my opinion for Spohn to be "liable" it must be proven that Spohn in some way either encouraged, or allowed this act to happen. Simply having the act to occur isn't enough. What happened here is completely sad but suing a 3rd party just because they have money doesn't make it right. If Spohn withheld evidence or in any way interfered with the investigation in any way, that’s an issue between the DA and Spohn, not the family. Unless there was a law change I don’t know about there isn’t any requirement for a company to give up ANYTHING of this nature unless under court order. How would you feel if I demanded your family home videos for example because I tripped in your yard? How do you know I’m not going to use it for something else (like where you hide your keys or the layout of your home), etc.

This is greed pure and simple. I feel for the family but I sure hope they loose, for all our sake. It’s funny how wolves circle when they smell blood....

Posted by visuallink on August 6, 2007 at 7:05 p.m. (Suggest removal)

It's not greed and its not lawsuit abuse... Debra had all the money and was going to put them all through college, and lead them to great lives. Now she is gone. Who is going to put them through college? Who is going to provide for the children now? How are the two little ones going to survive without their mother being able to provide for them? The youngest one has Down syndrome! Debra put all the food on the table. SHE HAD ALL THE MONEY! It's not greed, it's about the kids being able to live great lives from here on out and helping cope with what happend to Debbie without having to worry about the dangers of not having any money on top of losing their mother.

You people don't know this family so how the hell would you know what is going on in their minds right now? It's not GREED or MONEY or any kind of open opportunity for money. This is how you get back at corporation for not providing a safe environment. The Corporation is GREEDY, not the Slough's. They don't like to give a dime to anyone.. Sure anyone will accept the money from a lawsuit, but they would drop this whole damn lawsuit if they saw Debra walk right through that front door because this lawsuit isn't exactly about money. You speak like you know who they are. You don't. You have no idea because this has never happend to any of you. I see them every day, and we all pass by Debra's grave everyday. You are all just people with lowdown opinions because you were never in this situation. They will win, and I will be right at their side when they do. And when they do, everything you people say, and all the criticism towards the lawsuit will amount to nothing.

Lawsuit abuse, greed....? Hush with all this crap. It's not true. They would give it all up to see Debbie's face again. All you all can do is compare it to an abduction from Target which is a portion size of Spohn, or something IDIOTIC like "tripping in the front yard". This was a murder, not a trip. You all sound so childish.

You hope they lose for your sake? What sake? The only people who have anything to lose is the family. Not you. Why should Spohn raise your healthcare costs when they make billions of dollars in profits to cover for it EVERY SINGLE YEAR! If healthcare does go up, it should only be like 5 dollars per person, because of all the people registered that 5 dollars will cover for their money loss in a heart beat. Why should Spohn raise your health care? Don't they sound greedy? The money that Spohn will lose from this lawsuit is like a penny out of their pocket. Spohn are the greedy ones, not anyone else.

Posted by rramos4us on August 7, 2007 at 5:57 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Again I agree with visualink. Yes, your right 100% The greed and lies are what's fueling this case. Lawsuit abuse?? Whoever said that needs to have their heads examined. What's it to these people? Are they paying to take care of the kids in this case. What if it was you? Then they would be concerned. Hey , they need to provide a safe place to work not trying to cover up mistakes. No COver-ups Just pay up and then leave this family alone. They have suffered enough.

Posted by narc on August 7, 2007 at 9:13 a.m. (Suggest removal)

visualink,
your insults speak a great deal about your character. People have differences of opinions, that doesn't make them idiots or lowdown. Lawsuit abuse is everywhere in this town, and if you look at this from an unbiased point of view you can see an arguement for both sides. I have lost a family member due to a violent crime, so I do know what it is like. Insulting people doesn't make the pain go away, and neither does money.

Posted by grimjack41 on August 7, 2007 at 10:38 a.m. (Suggest removal)

And here we go again. People with this "YOU OWE ME" mentality. How will the kids get taken care of and go to school? Are you telling me that their father can’t work? Or that their grandparents can’t support them? That’s what family and insurance is for. If she could work as a nurse at Spohn I would think she could afford these things. What ever happened to planning for the worst and self reliance in our community? No it’s not my responsibility to take care of myself it’s the big bad greedy company’s fault and their job!

Here is another question, are they asking for enough to send the kids to college and bury her or are they asking for millions in damages? I might buy the argument if it was for school and burial costs (I would still disagree but could buy the argument) but why millions few people make more than 1 million in their entire life! Yet they want to be millionaires. Why because they can ie lawsuit abuse.

If Spohn killed her or allowed her to be killed, I would agree they should be punished but THEY HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH IT!!!!!!! It was a private citizen stalker! If Spohn had gone after him, they could have faced a REAL and VALID lawsuit called discrimination! If he was loitering, the most they could have done is called the police but loitering isn’t even enough for a restraining order or a fine!

What I meant by "for our sake" is because if she wins, a standard will be set in this area which will further drive the medical community out. I don't know about you but I don't want to go to SA every time I go for a check up. Companies are in business to make money, period if due to lawsuits and the requirements they put on them, it costs more to operate than they make, either they raise the prices or leave. There is something else factored into the price and it’s called RISK. If a company is in a high LAWSUIT RISK AREA, like we are in they will charge more to cover the eventual lawsuit risk…. In other words YOU pay in advance for the lawsuit that YOU will file…..

Once again if my point hasn’t been made the family gets a short term benefit but EVERYONE ELSE LOSES in the long run, including them.

Weather YOU like it or not WE should take responsibility for our own actions and family. What has happened is horrible and I do feel for the family. I would like you to know though how this money will “help”? Will it bring her back? No. Will it change anything, no because what did they do wrong? What is the family trying to change? Will it raise the cost of medical care? Yes. So what will it help?

Posted by grimjack41 on August 7, 2007 at 10:38 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Hospitals are a business like any other. There is no LAW that REQUIRES any business to guarantee its employees security. They try to offer it as a benefit so that their employees feel secure. The company security isn’t police officers and so have no authority to detain, arrest, question, etc. Security and protection is a GOVERNMENT requirement. If they had a security officer go with her and both ended up dead would then both families sue Spohn for not sending a 3rd a 4th, a 5th, the whole hospital? Where does it end?

I'm sorry but no amount of insults will change these facts and if you have to justify your actions to sleep at night, then maybe you know deep down that you are doing something WRONG….

Posted by rramos4us on August 7, 2007 at 1:03 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Here is a suggestion. If you need a doctor load up and drive to S.A. If you think that this case is law suit abuse. Go there and tell the doctor to change your diapers and wipe your tears away because of all the crying your doing Wah Wah!. This has to do with a family and that's all. Leave this family alone and mind your bisness. Then everyone wins. I hope Sphon has to pay big bucks for the lies and cover-ups.

Posted by visuallink on August 7, 2007 at 6:11 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Grimjack, maybe you don't understand the concept of a "profit." A "profit" is money left over after all a company's expenses. Spohn made 1.5 BILLION (not million, but billion) dollars in profit in 2006, and most likely something similar to that this year. You don't use profit to pay for expenses because profit is whats left over AFTER THEY ARE ALREADY PAID.

It is the company's fault, partly. The best way to deal with a criminal is prison time and the best way to deal with a corporation is money. Face it, facts are facts. It's how things work. They had poor security, no one to watch the cameras, and a film to prove that the man was on the property. Do you not know how long he was on Spohn before he made a move? Maybe you need to do some more studying.

The point is that in a building like this, someone should at least be watching the camera room, and security should always be circling the building. What everyone fails to realize is how long Alvarez was actually on the property before he abducted Debbie. It was 4 or more hours.

Target - Girl gets abducted. Man runs up, grabs her, and leaves. The man was only on the premises for about 5 to 10 mins, which really isn't a reasonably amount of time for security to classify someone as suspicious.

Spohn - Alvarez walks around in and out of the building, numerously passing security guards, parking lots, and spends about 4 hours looking for a victim OUT IN THE OPEN where he could be seen at 3pm, and is even caught on tape. 4 hours? Don't you think a man who is constantly moving around this place is suspicious after 4 hours? Or was there not enough security to notice this guy? He was even peaking into car windows...something the patient noticed and the guards didn't notice. The guards just walked around because they had to...It's the hire officials who are responsible for training the guards properly even if they pay them minimum wage.
Alvarez was walking around, looking suspicious, trying to find the perfect opportunity to take someone. I mean, if there was enough security like there should be, then one of the guards should have said himself, "hey...I've seen this guy at least 6 or 7 times pass by me going in different directions, and I've even seen him in the building walking the halls, I wonder what he's doing here?" Alvarez was on the property for a long time. Security should always be alert of their surroundings, and if 2 or 3 guards isn't enough, then there should be more. If security was adequate then most likely one of them would have stopped him and escorted him off the building.

*Continues on the next comment*

Posted by visuallink on August 7, 2007 at 6:16 p.m. (Suggest removal)

*continuation of the comment above*

Why has security improved significantly at Spohn every since Debbie's death if this is true like some are saying? Wait..maybe the question is... Why wasn't security as good back then as it is right now? Maybe because they were lazy and not properly trained to be alert because they couldn't spot a man to be suspicious who was on the premises for FOUR hours and walking all around their parking lots and inside the building.

If all these facts weren't true about Alvarez then the lawsuit wouldn't even be going on right now. The lawyers, me, the family, and everyone else truly believe that Spohn is somewhat at fault based on the facts that Alvarez told the reporters and interviewers when they asked him how long he was on the premises, what he was doing on the premises, where he abducted her from, and how he did it and all the other heartbreaking facts from this story.

Posted by bill_sebring on August 8, 2007 at 11:39 a.m. (Suggest removal)

I will agree that there is lawsuit abuse, but I also think that it's been hyped up for a purpose. Business and the almighty dollar is not some holy alter that we should hide behind, as an excuse for not going after someone when they've been, wait for the word, "Negligient". I do agree with visuallink here. The security situation was NOTHING but a joke. If you were in this families shoes Grimjack, you'd be screaming as loudly as they were. The hospital was denying it had security tapes, when in fact they did. There is a problem with Lawsuit abuse, but that is not an excuse for business to hide behind when it's screwed up.

Posted by robertnsheri on August 9, 2007 at 9:20 p.m. (Suggest removal)

visuallink....

So was the criminal on property 4 or 6 hours? You never answered my question! I posted exactly what you said on previous postings and you said 4 and then you said 6! Hmmmm...

Also, if you're so CLOSE to the family....then get together with other family members and do a fundraiser (to send the kids to college) instead of trying to blame a HOSPITAL for actions of a criminal.

Also, if you think you can do a better job at securing a HOSPITAL and you want to prevent this from happening again....GET A JOB AT A HOSPITAL FOR THE SECURITY DEPARTMENT.

Posted by robertnsheri on August 9, 2007 at 9:20 p.m. (Suggest removal)

Also, the guards (security officers) are NOT paid minimum wage. But yet you know so much!

Posted by visuallink on August 10, 2007 at 2:30 a.m. (Suggest removal)

I don't remember saying "Security at Spohn gets paid minimum wage."

I said they should be properly trained even if they were being paid minimum wage. If they are paid more than that, then hell, they should have been top of the line.

I'm not blaming the hospital for Alvarez's actions. I'm blaming the hospital for not having enough security when this happend. I mean hell, 4 to 6 hours, maybe longer? Must I repeat my whole article all over again? If you are trying to tell me that there was nothing wrong with security on the day of this tragedy, then tell me how he got away with everything he did that day on the premises. You must have not seen the news two years ago when they had him on camera admitting what he did on the hospital, and how long he was there. And as I've said before, the lawsuit wouldn't have been filed if he hadn't have been all over the hospital for half the morning hours.

And by the way.. If I had control over how the hospital operates then security would not be a problem.

Posted by robertnsheri on August 10, 2007 at 10:23 a.m. (Suggest removal)

Then make a difference and change that! Hmmm, no response about a fundraiser huh?? Also, most people involved in criminal activity do not always tell the truth.

Posted by robertnsheri on August 10, 2007 at 6:44 p.m. (Suggest removal)

grimjack41:

Great points....but he (visuallink) will never understand that!!

Posted by dannoynted1 on August 11, 2007 at 4:54 a.m. (Suggest removal)

The truth is Bank o and McDonough bailed because they knew the Chit was fixing to hit and attach itself to the proverbial FAN!

It stinks!